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. 1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

Case No. 920601-CA

:

Priority No. 2

v.
JEFF SCOTT, a/k/a
JEFFERY C. SCOTT,

Defendant-Appellant. :
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
Defendant Jeff Scott, a/k/a Jeffery C. Scott, appeals
his conviction for theft, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404, -412(1)(b)(i) (1990), entered
pursuant to a jury verdict in the First Judicial District Court,
in and for Box Elder County, Utah, the Honorable Clint S.
Judkins, presiding.

This Court has appellate jurisdiction

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1992).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
For reasons set forth in the body of this brief, the
State answers the issues presented by defendant, but leads with
an alternative ground for affirmance of the trial court's denial
of his motion to suppress evidence.
1.

So framed, the issues are:

Can this Court Affirm the Trial Court's Denial of

Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, on the Alternative
Ground that the Inventory Search of the Automobile in Which
Defendant was a Passenger was Constitutionally Proper?

The

advisability of affirming a trial court's ruling on a proper
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

alternative ground is, by nature, considered de novo on appeal.
On the merits, to prevail on this issue, the State must persuade
this Court that the trial court erroneously ruled that the
inventory search was improper.

While the standard of review is

open to question, the State will demonstrate error even under the
deferential, "clear error" standard of review.

Cf.. State v.

Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 268 (Utah 1985) (describing inventory search
validity as a "finding," suggesting deferential review).
2.

Did the Trial Court Correctly Deny Defendant's

Motion to Suppress Evidence, Seized Pursuant to the Inventory
Search, on the Basis that Defendant, as a Passenger, Had No
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy in the Searched Area of the
Automobile?

Because the underlying facts are largely undisputed,

this question, often referred to as one of "standing," can be
approached as a matter of law, according no particular deference
to the trial court.

See United States v. Padilla,

U.S.

,

113 S. Ct. 1936 (1993) (per curiam), and Rakas v. Illinois, 439
U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978) (both treating this question as
one of federal law).
3.

Was Defendant's Conviction for Theft, Entered Upon

a Jury Verdict, Supported by Sufficient Evidence, such that the
Trial Court Properly Denied Defendant's Post-Verdict Motion to
Arrest Judgment?
Appellant.)
deferential;

(Consolidating issues 2 and 3 in Br. of

Appellate review of a jury verdict is highly
"so long as some evidence and reasonable inferences

support the jury's findings, we will not disturb them."
2
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State v.

Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah App. 1990).

See also State v.

Workman, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1993) (motions to arrest
judgment under Utah R. Crim. P. 23, asserting evidentiary
insufficiency, also entail high deference to jury).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution are
practically identical in their language.

The former provision

reads:
The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Any other constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules pertinent
to the resolution of the issue on appeal will be set forth in the
body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
As set forth by defendant (Br. of Appellant at 3-5),
this appeal arises from a conviction for theft of money.
Defendant's pretrial motion to suppress evidence was denied, as
was his post-trial motion, founded on a claim of evidentiary
insufficiency, to arrest judgment on the jury's guilty verdict.

3
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1

He appeals, asserting that these rulings (reproduced in the
appendix to this brief) were erroneous.1
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The evidence supporting defendant's guilt is recited in
the light favorable to the jury's verdict.
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 4 (Utah 1993).

State v. Workman/ 212

The facts supporting the trial

court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress are recited in
detail.

State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d 1056, 1057 (Utah App. 1992).
Money Theft in Brigham City
At about 11:00 a.m. on February 13, 1992, employee

Shari Oiler carried 428 dollars cash into Drewes Floral Shop in
Brigham City, Utah.

The cash, withdrawn from the First Security

Bank branch in Brigham City, was to be used in the course of the
store's busy, Valentine's Day Eve business (R. 729-30, 732-33,
976).
The store manager directed Ms. Oiler to lock the cash
in a desk drawer, in the store's office (R. 730, 736). As she
headed toward the office, Ms. Oiler encountered defendant's
companion, Reynolds, near a store display.

Still holding the

cash, in a money bag so "stuffed" ilf could not be closed, she
answered Reynolds's inquiry about flowers (R. 735, 737, 740-41).
As she proceeded to the office, which was not used as a flower
display area, defendant emerged from it (R. 736-37, 739).
Defendant inquired about a job application; after locking the
A

The main record is R. 1-210; transcripts are sequentially
paginated R. 211-1080.
Parenthetical record and transcript
references in this brief are therefore all designated "R."
4
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cash in the desk drawer, Ms. Oiler helped find an application for
him (R. 740-41) .
The store manager also noticed defendant and Reynolds
(R. 857, 862-63).2

According to the manager, both men received

job applications (R. 861-62).

The pair then spent another ten to

twenty minutes in the store (R. 743-44, 865). Apparently during
this time, a third store employee answered Reynolds's inquiries
about flowers, but did not see defendant.

While assisting

Reynolds, who made no purchase, this employee could not see into
the store office (R. 881-84).
At about 2:00 p.m., Ms. Oiler re-entered the office.
She discovered that the desk drawer had been forced open, and the
cash was missing (R. 745-46).
Money Recovery in Salt Lake City
Several hours after they were observed in Drewes Floral
Shop, police officers detained defendant and Reynolds near a
thrift store at 3606 South State Street in Salt Lake City, where
a purse snatching incident had been reported (R. 455, 756-57,
775-76).

The victim identified Reynolds as the culprit, but was

not deemed sufficiently certain about defendant's possible
involvement.

Therefore, Reynolds was arrested, and defendant was

allowed to leave (R. 455-57, 776-77, 785).
Before leaving, defendant told the officers that he and
Reynolds had driven to the thrift store in a Lincoln automobile,
2

0n appeal, defendant does not contest the store employees'
identification of him and Reynolds as the persons they encountered
in the store during the events in question (Br. of Appellant at 3).
5
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driven by Reynolds and parked nearby (R. 457-58).
was owned by Reynolds's father or grandfather.

The vehicle

The officers

tried to contact the owner, but were unsuccessful (R. 481-82).3
Defendant had no driver's license; thereby unauthorized to drive
the Lincoln away, he departed on foot (R. 458, 762). The
officers impounded the Lincoln (R. 458). Obtaining its keys from
Reynolds, they performed an inventory search (R. 460-61, 766).
In the Lincoln's locked glovebox, the officers
discovered about 376 dollars in cash, including some rolled coins
(R. 460-61, 760-61, 770, 957-58).

A bundle of one-dollar bills

among this cash was bound with a paper band that, in turn, bore
printed identification from the Brigham City branch of First
Security Bank (R. 461-62, 762, 811). Reynolds first claimed that
the cash belonged to his grandfather.

He then changed his story

and told the officers that he had won it in a craps game (R. 794,
816-17).
It does not appear that defendant was asked about the
money at the time of Reynolds's arrest (R. 815). Nor does the
record reflect that he ever asked permission to retrieve any
personal property from the Lincoln, although he had apparently
left some audiotapes and a tape player in the vehicle (R. 482).
The identification band on the cash prompted contact
between Salt Lake and Brigham City police (R. 825-26).

3

The

It appears that the Lincoln's owner lived in Brigham City (R.
786), about fifty miles away from the site of Reynolds's arrest.
6
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ensuing investigation led to defendant's arrest; he and Reynolds
were jointly charged with the Drewes Floral Shop theft (R. 2-3).
Motion to Suppress and Trial
The trial court granted Reynolds's motion to suppress
the cash seized from the Lincoln's glovebox, ruling that the
vehicle had been improperly impounded, and therefore, the cash
improperly seized during the ensuing inventory search.

This

ruling turned on the trial court's belief that impoundment of the
Lincoln required some "nexus," found to be lacking, between the
vehicle and the purse snatching incident for which Reynolds was
arrested (R. 510). The court also ruled that defendant had not
shown that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
Lincoln or, more precisely, the Lincoln's glovebox.

Therefore,

the suppression order did not extend to defendant (R. 507-11).
Defendant's trial was severed from the proceedings
involving Reynolds. At trial, the wrapping of the bills and
coins found in Reynolds's Lincoln was shown to resemble that of
the cash issued to Shari Oiler by the Brigham City First Security
Bank on the morning of the Drewes Floral Shop theft (R. 957-58,
976-83).

Presented with this and the circumstantial evidence

already recited, the jury found defendant guilty of the theft (R.
170).

His motion to arrest judgment was denied, and he was

sentenced to a term of zero to five years at the Utah State
Prison (R. 178-80).

7
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court need not reach defendant's state
constitution-based argument for expansive "standing" to invoke
the exclusionary rule against improperly seized evidence.
Instead, this Court can affirm the denial of defendant's motion
to suppress on the alternative ground that the challenged
automobile inventory search was proper; the trial court's ruling
to the contrary was erroneous.

That ruling turned on the court's

legally incorrect view that some connection between Reynolds's
Lincoln and the offense for which Reynolds was arrested was
required in order to impound the vehicle.
needed.

No such connection is

Proper analysis looks to the police need to properly

caretake a motor vehicle when no other responsible person is
available to do so.

That analysis was satisfied here, and the

Lincoln was properly impounded.
Under settled fourth amendment law, the trial court
correctly held that defendant had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the Lincoln's glovebox.

Although placed on notice to

do so, defendant failed to provide any evidence, beyond his
status as a passenger in the vehicle, "teo show that he had any
expectation of privacy in it or in its glovebox.

Defendant's

argument for expanded "standing" to assert search and seizure
violations under the Utah Constitution also fails. He does not
show that fourth amendment standing limitations are flawed, a
necessary predicate to departure from federal search and seizure
law.

The federal limitations balance the truth-subverting costs

8
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of the exclusionary rule against its deterrent benefit.

That

balance ought not be disturbed under the state constitution.
The evidence adequately supported the trial verdict.
No unusual circumstances, such as "physical impossibility,"
compel this court to reweigh the evidence.

The reasonable

inferences gleaned from that evidence amply support the jury's
finding of guilt.

Every element of theft, taking into account

the accomplice liability instruction given to the jury, could be
found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, and not merely as a
matter of remote possibilities.

The same analysis was correctly

applied by the trial court, leading to its proper denial of
defendant's post-trial motion to arrest judgment.
1

ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE VEHICLE IN WHICH DEFENDANT WAS A
PASSENGER WAS PROPERLY IMPOUNDED; ON THIS
ALTERNATIVE BASIS, THE DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS CAN BE AFFIRMED.

A.

This Court May Prudently Avoid the Sweeping
Constitutional Issue Posed by Defendant.
As a part of his first point on appeal, defendant urges

this Court, under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution,
to depart from the federal rule of limited "standing" to
challenge searches and seizures, and expand the class of persons
who may invoke the exclusionary rule.

See Rakas v. Illinois, 439

U.S. 128, 99 S. Ct. 421 (1978) (mere passengers in automobile,
with no possessory interest in it or its contents, lacked
standing to contest alleged illegal search thereof).

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Under the

rule he proposes, defendant, like Reynolds, would be entitled to
suppression of the cash seized from the Lincoln's glovebox, under
the trial court's ruling that the Lincoln was unconstitutionally
impounded and inventoried.
Defendant's proposed rule would constitute a dramatic
break from settled federal law.
under their own constitutions.

States can make such departures
E.g., California v. Greenwood,

486 U.S. 35, 43, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 1630 (1988); State v. Larocco,
794 P.2d 460, 465-71 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion).

However,

such departures burden law enforcement, defense attorneys,
prosecutors, and courts with the necessity of learning new search
and seizure law, parallel to yet substantively different from
federal principles.

That burden ought not be lightly imposed.

The prudent course is for a court to avoid making
sweeping new constitutional rules if it need not do so in order
to decide the case before it.

See State v. Thurman, 203 Utah

Adv. Rep. 18, 21 (Utah 1993).

That course is available here, for

an appellate court can affirm a trial court's ruling on any
proper ground, even one not identified by the trial court.

State

v. Brvan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985); State v. Harrison, 805
P.2d 769, 782 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah
1991).

Such a course is available even if it entails reversal of

a ruling actually made by the trial court.

Wallis v. Thomas, 632

P.2d 39, 43 (Utah 1981); accord Soldal v. Cook County,
_ _ , 113 S. Ct. 538, 543 n.6 (1992).

10
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U.S.

Settled law permits this Court to reverse the trial
court's ruling that Reynolds's vehicle was improperly impounded.
As follows, such reversal also allows this Court to correct the
trial court's erroneous legal view of inventory search law, and
provide clear guidance for similar future cases.
B.

Under the Relevant Circumstances, the Vehicle was
Properly Impounded.
It is unclear whether trial court rulings on the

appropriateness of vehicle impoundments are reviewed on appeal
for clear error, or under the nondeferential "correction of
[legal] error" standard.

Compare State v. Hvqh, 711 P.2d 264,

268 (Utah 1985) (describing such ruling as a "finding,"
suggesting deferential review), with State v. Stricklinq, 844
P.2d 979, 986 (Utah App. 1992) (stating that "this [appellate]
court must determine" propriety of impoundment, suggesting
nondeferential review).

In this case, the trial court's ruling

that Reynolds's Lincoln was improperly impounded fails even under
the "clear error" standard, because that ruling was induced by a
specific, incorrect view of the law.

See State v. Walker, 743

P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (trial court factual findings are
clearly erroneous if against the clear weight of the evidence or
"induced by an erroneous view of the law").
The trial court's specific error lay in its acceptance
of defendant's assertion that some kind of "nexus" between
Reynolds's Lincoln—actually owned by his father or grandfather,
and the purse snatching crime for which Reynolds was arrested,
was required in order to justify the Lincoln's impoundment.
11
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By

"nexus," the trial court evidently meant that the vehicle had to
be used in furtherance of the purse snatching (R. 510, copied in
appendix to this brief).

The Lincoln was not so used.

But no such "nexus" is required.

Defendant advanced no

legal support for his "nexus" argument (R. 471), and no such
support can be gleaned from case law.

In Hvqh, Utah's leading

automobile impoundment case, the Utah Supreme Court mentioned no
"nexus" requirement.

Instead, an impoundment need only be

"reasonable," that is, either authorized by statute or necessary,
"under the circumstances surrounding the initial stop," to
protect the vehicle and its contents, 711 P.2d at 268. The
impoundment and ensuing inventory search must also be conducted
pursuant to standardized police policy.

Id.

Accord Stricklinq,

844 P.2d at 985-86.
In this case, the trial court found that police
impounded Reynolds's Lincoln, pursuant to standardized policy.
The policy provided for impoundment "[w]hen the person driving or
in control of such vehicle is arrested" (R. 495; acknowledged by
trial court at R. 509-10).*

The trial court also found that the

failure of the impounding officers to include the name of the
off-scene, impoundment-authorizing officer on their "impound

4

A1though the written impound policy in issue here has not
been transmitted to the State with the record on appeal, it was
admitted as an exhibit at the hearing on defendant's motion to
suppress, along with the "impound report" and a listing of the
items found during the inventory search (R. 464-66). The quoted
portions in this brief were rcsad aloud during the hearing on the
motion to suppress.
12
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report" was a technical error that did not defeat the legitimacy
of the inventory search (R. 508)•

These findings were proper.

The trial court further found that no other
arrangements for safekeeping of the Lincoln and its contents were
reasonably available.

That finding was proper under the trial

court's observation that the arrestee Reynolds, in charge of the
vehicle, could not reasonably arrange for its care (R. 509-10).
Defendant, although not arrested, had no driver's license and
could not drive the Lincoln (R. 458). Further, the police had
attempted to call the Lincoln's actual owner, and had received no
answer (R. 481-82).

This met their policy requirement that "[i]n

cases of driver arrest . . ., deputies will attempt to locate a
responsible party who can assume custody of the vehicle within a
reasonable period of time, with the permission of the owner or
driver" (R. 477-78).5

See Hvah, 711 P.2d at 264 (approving

similar impound policy provision).

Thus, as required by Hvah and

Stricklinq, the Lincoln's impoundment was reasonable under the
circumstances, even though not explicitly authorized by statute.

5

In the trial court, defendant argued that he should have been
given custody of the Lincoln (R. 478). The trial court properly
disregarded this argument which, if accepted, would defeat the
caretaking and police liability considerations that underpin the
inventory search exception to the warrant requirement, outlined in
Hvah, 711 P.2d at 267.
Unable to reach the actual owner—
Reynolds's father or grandfather, the police would have invited
liability for property damage or loss, had they released the
vehicle to defendant.
Mr. Reynolds, Senior, could have been
justifiably displeased to learn that his vehicle had been turned
over, by police and without his permission, to defendant, a nonfamily member, unlicensed to drive.
13
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The trial court went awry by engrafting a "nexus" rule
on to the foregoing, settled impoundment and inventory search
principles*

Such a rule would effectively require that whenever

an automobile driver is arrested, police must leave the vehicle
wherever it is stopped or found, even when nobody else can be
located to take charge of it, unless the vehicle is an
instrumentality of the crime that prompted the arrest.

This

undercuts the caretaking and liability-avoidance functions that
automobile impoundment and inventory rules are intended to
permit, under Hyqh, 711 P.2d at 267, as a matter of both state
and federal constitutional law.

If anything, those functions are

especially important in a case such as this one, where the
vehicle in question belongs not to the driver, but to an absent
owner who cannot be contacted to reclaim it.
Therefore, the "nexus" rule, advanced by defendant in
the trial court, is both legally unsupported and ill-advised.
Because the trial court erroneously adopted that rule, it
committed clear error in ruling that the Lincoln was unreasonably
impounded.

Under the correct legal standards, the Lincoln was

reasonably impounded, properly inventoried pursuant to the
impoundment, and the cash was properly seized from its glovebox.
This Court should therefore reverse the trial court's
ruling that the cash was suppressible under federal or state
constitutional exclusionary rules.

Such reversal cannot change

the outcome (whatever it was) of Reynolds's prosecution for the
Drewes Floral Shop theft, because the State did not appeal from
14
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the suppression ruling granted in Reynolds's favor.

It does,

however, provide a solid alternative ground for denying the
suppression motion advanced by this defendant.
POINT TWO
DEFENDANT HAD NO REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF
PRIVACY, BASED SOLELY ON HIS PASSENGER
STATUS, IN THE SEARCHED AREAS OF THE
AUTOMOBILE.
A.

Defendant had No Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
Under the Fourth Amendment.
Fourth amendment "standing," that is, the extent of

federally-defined "reasonable expectations of privacy," is an
issue of substantive federal law that states are not at liberty
to alter.

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-40, 99 S. Ct.

421, 428-29 (1978); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 44, 108
S. Ct. 1625, 1631 (1988) ("Respondent's argument is no less than
a suggestion that concepts of privacy under the laws of each
State are to determine the reach of the Fourth Amendment.

We do

not accept this submission"); State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132,
1138 (Utah 1989).

Under the fourth amendment, defendant had no

reasonable expectation of privacy in Reynolds's Lincoln, and
particularly not in its locked glovebox.
In Rakas, the Supreme Court held that passengers in a
searched vehicle, who claimed no possessory interest in the
vehicle or in items kept in it, lacked standing to complain that
items kept beneath the vehicle's seat and in its glovebox were
improperly seized under the fourth amendment.
49, 99 S. Ct. at 433.

439 U.S. at 148-

The Court observed that just as a casual
15
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house guest cannot claim a personal privacy expectation in the
host's entire home, neither can a mere passenger claim a personal
privacy interest in the under-seat and glovebox areas of an
automobile.

439 U.S. at 142, 143-44, 99 S. Ct. at 430, 433.

Because defendant's claim of an expectation of privacy
turns upon nothing more than his status as Reynolds's passenger,
his standing to assert a fourth amendment violation in the search
of the Lincoln's glovebox fails under the controlling law set
forth in Rakas.

Even if that search was unconstitutional, then,

the cash seized from the glovebox was admissible into evidence
against defendant.
On appeal, defendant attempts to circumvent Rakas by
raising the "possibility" that he had a possessory interest in
the seized cash.

The act of leaving his tape player in the

vehicle's passenger compartment, he asserts, is also "some
evidence" of his expectation of privacy.

Without asserting that

he asked Reynolds to lock the Lincoln and its glovebox, defendant
urges this Court to find a privacy expectation, held by him,
because "many passengers in vehicles" do make such requests (Br.
+

of Appellant at 8-9).

Defendant's attempts to prove fourth amendment standing
on appeal should be summarily rejected.

His standing was

squarely challenged by the State in the trial court (R. 88, 470).
At that point, defendant was obliged to establish his standing,
through proof of supporting facts.

State v. Atwood, 831 P.2d
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1056, 1057-58 (Utah App. 1992).6

He put on no such proof, and

cannot now, upon mere "possibilities," ask this Court to find the
needed facts for him.
Defendant complains that he was unfairly disadvantaged
because, in order to prove his expectation of privacy, he may
have been obliged to claim a possessory interest in the seized
cash.

Such obligation, he complains, puts him in the untenable

position of implicitly admitting that he stole the cash (Br. of
Appellant at 10). However, the offense of theft, for which
defendant was charged and convicted, contains no "possession"
element, beyond some brief "unauthorized control" over the stolen
property.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990) (jury instructions at

R. 151, 153). Further, under the alternative accomplice
liability theory alleged by the State (R. 123, 154), defendant
could be found guilty of theft even had he never personally
"controlled" the cash.

Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990).

While unexplained possession of recently stolen
property is "prima facie evidence" that the possessor is the
thief under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-402 (1990), trial courts cannot
*
6

The "reasonable expectation of privacy" analysis, derived
from Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507 (1967), actually has two parts. First,
the proponent must prove that he or she actually subjectively
expected that the searched area was private as to him or her.
Second, the proponent must prove that the expectation was
legitimate in the view of society. 389 U.S. at 361, 88 S. Ct. at
516 (Harlan, J., concurring). As to the first part, defendant not
only failed to allege a subjective privacy expectation, his actions
actually belied such expectation:
when released following
Reynolds's arrest, he did not tarry to claim any items in the
Lincoln, but literally ran from the scene (R. 762). Rakas disposes
of the second part of the Katz analysis.
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so instruct the jury.
1987).

State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043, 1045 (Utah

The jury was not so instructed in this case; nor was

defendant's own possession of the cash particularly important,
given that defendant need only have acted as Reynolds's
accomplice in the theft.

Therefore, for purposes of proving that

he had an expectation of privacy against the glovebox search,
defendant could have asserted a possessory interest in the cash
contained therein, without unduly compromising his defense to the
theft charge.

His failure to do so defeats his "standing"

argument under the fourth amendment.
B.

Defendant Makes No Persuasive Case for Expanding
his Privacy Expectations under Article I, Section
14 of the Utah Constitution.
Having failed to carry his burden to prove fourth

amendment standing, defendant asks this Court to substantially
lighten that burden, under article I, section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

The rule he proposes would confer standing, to

challenge searches, upon persons who are no more than passengers
in searched automobiles.

Thus defendant's mere "legitimate

presence" in Reynolds's Lincoln, he argues, gave him, no less
than Reynolds, a reasonable expectation of privacy against
improper police intrusion into the vehicle.
Defendant filed a supplemental memorandum in the trial
court, arguing for expanded search and seizure standing along the
foregoing lines, under article I, section 14 (R. 113-18).

Though

filed after his motion to suppress had been denied, the trial
court received defendant's memorandum and rejected his arguments
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on their merits (R. 704). Accordingly, his state constitutional
argument has been preserved for appellate review*
On appeal, however, defendant advances his argument in
only cursory, conclusory fashion.

In but three paragraphs (Br.

of Appellant at 10-11), he asks this Court to adopt the
"legitimate presence" view of standing espoused by the dissenters
in Rakas, 439 U.S. at 156-69, 99 S. Ct. at 437-44 (1978) (White,
J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, JJ.).
Defendant does not brief his state constitutional
argument in the manner prescribed in State v. Bobo, 803 P.2d
1268, 1272 n.5 (Utah App. 1990).

He does not argue that the

Rakas majority rule of limited federal search and seizure
"standing" is inappropriate or unworkable, and cites no scholarly
criticism of the federal rule.7

Under State v. Thompson, 810

P.2d 415, 417-18 (Utah 1991), and State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460,
466-70 (Utah 1990) (plurality opinion), such analysis appears to
be the key requirement for the development of more expansive
state constitutional search and seizure rules by Utah courts.
This Court may therefore disregard defendant's
expansive, state constitution-based "standing" argument on
appeal, for lack of adequate briefing.

See State v. Yates, 834

P.2d 599, 602 (Utah App. 1992) (declining to address inadequate
appellate argument under Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), and citing
7

The Rakas majority's rule is now firmly established. See
United States v. Padilla, 113 S. Ct. 1936 (1993) (per curiam
opinion overruling, without dissent, the Ninth Circuit Federal
Court of Appeals's "coconspirator exception" to the Rakas limited
"standing" rule).
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(

supporting precedent); accord State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 450
(Utah 1988) (approving principle that appealing party may not
"dump the burden of argument and research" in the appellate
court).

The issue can simply await another day.
If this Court does consider defendant's state

constitutional argument on its merits, it should reject it.

The

Rakas dissent, relied upon by defendant, was directly rebutted in
the majority opinion.

439 U.S. at 144-48, 99 S. Ct. at 431-33

(rejecting "legitimate presence" theory as "a phrase which at
most has superficial clarity and which conceals beneath that thin
veneer all of the problems of line drawing which must be faced in
any conscientious effort to apply the Fourth Amendment").
Besides overruling the "legitimate presence" theory
suggested in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S. Ct. 725
(1960), and now advanced by defendant to support his argument
under the Utah Constitution (Br. of Appellant at 10), the Rakas
majority also distinguished that case.

The defendant in Jones

was not only "legitimately present" in the searched place, an
apartment:

he had been given the apartment keys, kept some

clothing there, and, at the time of thee challenged search, was
occupying it alone, in the lessee's absence.
141, 99 S. Ct. at 429.

Rakas, 439 U.S. at

In this case, defendant had no similarly

full access to or control over Reynolds's Lincoln;

his argument

for "standing" to contest the vehicle's search is therefore very
weak, compared to that of the defendant-petitioner in Jones.
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Besides having been rejected in Rakas, 439 U.S. at 13435, 99 S. Ct. at 426, the "target" theory also advanced by
defendant would not help him.

Defendant was not the "target" of

the inventory search of Reynolds's Lincoln.

Although detained at

the purse snatching scene with Reynolds, defendant was released
when the officers concluded that they did not have probable cause
to arrest him (R. 789-90).

The discovery of the cash, even if

made before defendant left the scene, did not prompt officers to
detain him further.8

Only later did he again become an

investigatory target, when the identification markings on the
cash led officers to the floral shop theft in Brigham City.
Finally, the Rakas majority identified valid policy
reasons for limited standing to assert search and seizure
violations.

The Rakas limit strikes a balance between the

exclusionary rule's purpose of deterring police misconduct, and
the societal goals of truthseeking and deterring crime.

439 U.S.

at 137, 99 S. Ct. at 427; accord 439 U.S. at 152 & n.l, 99 S. Ct.
at 435 & n.l (Powell, J., concurring, joined by Burger, C.J.).
It does this by limiting the class of persons who may invoke the
exclusionary rule, to those who clearly persuade reviewing courts
that their own reasonable expectations of privacy, not those of
others, were violated by the police.
Particularly in a state like Utah, that originally
opposed the exclusionary rule in any prosecution, see State v.
8

It appears that the cash was not discovered until after
defendant left, for he was apparently not questioned about the cash
(R. 793).
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Aime, 62 Utah 476, 484-85, 220 P. 704, 708 (1923), the Rakas
balance ought not be disturbed under the state constitution.

As

a matter of policy, those who wish to invoke the exclusionary
rule, and avoid prosecution for reasons wholly independent of
their guilt or innocence, can properly be required to show more
than mere "legitimate presence" in a searched area.

In this

case, defendant made no such showing, and therefore cannot claim
the truth-subverting exclusionary rule remedy for his benefit.
POINT THREE
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF THEFT.
In his second and third points on appeal, defendant
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his theft
conviction.

This Court and the trial court, considering

defendant's motion to arrest judgment that raised the same
challenge, both review jury verdicts with great deference:

"[W]e

review the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be
drawn from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the
jury."

State v. Singer, 815 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah App. 1991)

(quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983)).
In State v. Workman,, 212 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (Utah 1993),
the Utah Supreme Court elaborated on the foregoing standard of
review, in the context of a motion to arrest judgment.

Given

some supporting evidence, the reviewing court asks
whether the inferences that can be drawn from that
evidence have a reasonable basis in logic and
reasonable human experience sufficient to prove
each legal element of the offense beyond a
reasonable doubt. A guilty verdict is not legally
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valid if it is based solely on inferences that
give rise to only remote or speculative
possibilities of guilt.
212 Utah Adv. Rep. at 4.

Reaching this explanation, the court

also approved a statement that a conviction may be set aside if
the supporting evidence is "clearly contrary to some immutable
law of physics or is hopelessly in conflict with one or more
established and uncontroverted physical facts."

J[d. (quoting

Siruta v. Hesston Corp., 659 P.2d 799, 806 (Kan. 1983)).
Defendant has forthrightly marshalled most of the
evidence that supports his conviction (Br. of Appellant at 3-4,
12-13), as required in State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 738 (Utah
App. 1990).

He admits his presence, with Reynolds, in Drewes

Floral Shop in Brigham City.

He admits his and Reynolds's

ability to see the cash, carried by Ms. Oiler into the store
office.

He admits that he was in that office, moments before

encountering Ms. Oiler.

Defendant admits that he and Reynolds

remained in the store for some time after speaking to Ms. Oiler,
and that at some point during this time, he was not seen, while
Reynolds spoke to an employee in the display area.
Defendant also admits his presence near the Salt Lake
City thrift store, still in Reynolds's company, several hours
after the pair was seen in Drewes Floral Shop:

this was ample

time to drive from Brigham City to Salt Lake City on Interstate
Highway 15, a distance of fifty to sixty miles.

The only

noteworthy item missing from defendant's evidence recitation is
the fact that the purse snatching victim in the thrift store
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observed both Reynolds and defendant in or near the thrift store
at about the moment of that crime. While identifying Reynolds as
the purse snatcher, the victim told investigating officers that
defendant appeared to be acting as Reynolds's lookout (R. 784-85,
elicited on defense cross examination).

Finally, defendant

admits that the cash found in Reynolds's Lincoln "appear[ed] to
be the stolen money" from Drewes Floral.9
This circumstantial evidence provided the necessary
"reasonable basis in logic" for the jury's guilty verdict.

From

it, the jury could reasonably infer that defendant and Reynolds
were acting cooperatively in Drewes Floral, one "covering" for
the other, who entered the store office, inferentially not an
area frequented by customers, in order to seek—eventually
successfully—something to steal.

That inference was bolstered

by later observations, at a Salt Lake City crime scene, of
defendant and Reynolds behaving in evidently similar, cooperative
fashion.

See State v. O'Neil, 206 Utah Adv. Rep. 14, 16-17 (Utah

App. 1993) (other acts, under Utah R. Evid. 404(b), are relevant
to prove intent, preparation, plan to commit charged crime).
Reynolds's possession of cash, resembling that stolen
from Drewes Floral, at the scene of the later Salt Lake City
crime, completed the evidentiary picture upon which the jury
could reasonably infer that defendant was guilty of theft.
Again, it was not necessary for defendant to ever personally
9

This is a proper admission, given Reynolds's inconsistent
account to police, heard by the trial jury, about how he had come
into possession of the cash (R. 794, 816-17).
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possess that money, so long as he could be found to have
intentionally aided Reynolds in stealing it, under the accomplice
liability theory, Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1990) (R. 123, 154).
The evidence permitted the jury to rule out the
possibility that defendant's presence, with Reynolds, at the two
crime scenes, was mere coincidence, and to find, beyond
reasonable doubt, that defendant intentionally participated in
the Drewes Floral Shop theft.

Under the terminology of Workman,

none of the evidence "hopelessly conflicts" with "immutable"
physical laws or, for that matter, with other evidence presented
at trial.

It supports a likelihood of guilt that is not "remote

or speculative," but realistic.
Accordingly, the trial court correctly rejected
defendant's motion to arrest judgment, against his claim of
evidentiary insufficiency.

This Court should affirm that ruling,

and, with it, the jury's guilty verdict.
CONCLUSION
Upon properly received, competent, sufficient evidence,
defendant was found guilty of theft.

Accordingly, his conviction

for that crime should be affirmed. *
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2 2 - day of June, 1993.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

J. KEVIN MURPHY
Assistant Attorney General
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APPENDIX
Trial Court Rulings on Motion to Suppress Evidence
and
Motion to Arrest Judgment

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE
reiterate what I said earlier.

I don't know that

there's anything new on that point.
THE COURT:

In ruling on this, gentlemen, I find

this to be a rather interesting case and interesting
in a couple of different ways.
First of all, I'll address the standing
issue.

The facts before this court are that defendant

Scott was a passenger in the vehicle; that he arrived
.at the location of where the vehicle was impounded as
a passenger; and that he left certain items of
personal property in the vehicle.

I think that in and

of itself, and it is the defendant's burden to show
that he has standing, is not sufficient to shoulder
that burden and I find that this defendant does not
have standing to raise the issue.
The reason for that is, I think, to
clarify it, this court needs to know his circumstances
as a passenger.

If he was a hitchhiker going down the

road and the driver of the vehicle got out and advised
him that, okay, I'll see you later and he left those
things inadvertantly in the vehicle, that might be one
thing.

If he was a passenger who had traveled a great

distance with the driver, if they had a mutual
agreement as to where they were going and under what
circumstances, that would give rise to facts that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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1 I would give standing.

But because of the facts before

2 | this court, I find that defendant Scott does not have
3 I standing.
4

.
Now, as relates to the search pertaining

5

to defendant Reynolds, I think Mr. Bunderson is

6

correct when he indicates that this is a search and

7

seizure, not a question of policy.

8

integral part of that, but this court must determine

9

whether or not the supression of the evidence in this

The policy is an

10

particular case is justified because of constitutional

11

guarantees, Fourth Amendment guarantees.

12

facts stipulated to in this case, and of course the

13

court can make a finding of fact in this case because

14

those facts are stipulated, this court finds that that

15

was an inventory search pursuant to an

16

From the

impoundment.

Then the question of the policy comes into

17

effect and that policy must be reasonable.

18

wouldn't -- in other words, because it is a policy it

19

doesn't give rise to the same type of credence which a

20

statute or an ordinance would give rise to.

21

Nevertheless, the court, in examining the policy,

22

finds that the policy, although vague in certain

23

areas, the policy is reasonable.

24
25

This court

Now, let's address the particular
arguments Mr. Mplgard made.

I find that there are
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certain reasons why it has supervisory approval*
Those reasons are evident. I feel f on why a supervisor
must approve this.

However, when the supervisor has

given certain police officers blanket approval to
impound under certain circumstances, I feel that that
is in compliance with the policy.

The reason for that

is that the supervisor may know those individuals who
he's given that blanket authority to and knows their
capability, their competency, and so he allows them to
do that.

I find that the technicality of not putting

the supervisor's name on the report is just that, a
technicality, and wouldn't strike it for that reason.
However/ the policy of an inventory search
has to be examined very closely because of its ability
to circumvent Fourth Amendment guarantees.

As I

examine the policies here, I think, again, they're
reasonable.

The two which apply are the policies that

when the person or persons in charge of such vehicle
are unable to provide for its custody or removal, or
when the person driving or in control of such vehicle
is arrested for an alleged offense for which the
officer is required by law to take the person arrested
before a magistrate without unnecessary delay.
Now, what these policies seem to
contemplate to this court is that when a person
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driving or in control cannot find somebody to provide
for the custody or removal of that vehicle under
reasonable circumstances, then possibly that could
take effect.

But I have extreme trouble with the, for

lack of a better term, and I'm not sure that this
falls within the case law on this, but I like Mr.
Oliver's term nexus, the lack of nexus between the
offense and the vehicle in this case.

There has to be

a reasonable basis to impound that vehicle.

It can't

be used as a sham to get to the items which are in the
vehicle.

If there had been any report in this case,

from the facts and circumstances, that that vehicle
was involved in this, I think the nexus would have
been arrived at.
Mr. Molgard raised the example of a
shoflifter in a store, do they go out and impound his
vehicle as being ludicrous.

Yet the facts and

circumstances of this case are very similar to that.
The alleged offense was in the store and the vehicle
was out in the parking lot.

Because of that, this

court finds no nexus, and I'll use that term, I
suppose, Mr. Oliver, I like it so I'll use it, I find
no nexus between the offense and the vehicle and
therefore would order that those items in the glove
box be suppressed as relates to defendant Reynolds.
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1

Because

2

does

defendant

not

apply

3

Scott

to

no

standing,

that

order

him.

Gentlemen,
appropriate

has

it

take

a lunch

does

appear

an

5

sure,

6

issue,

7

concerned, how he would be involved in further

8

hearings

9

made .

1 0 .
I
11
1:30,
12

what

of

can

on

the
be

the

a 45 m i n u t e
on

--

Honor.

15

it

in

far

as

at

--

lunch,

do

you

or

be

break.

I'm

on

particular

that

defendant

motions

to

that

can

we

want

not

Reynolds

have

is

been

make
to go

that
(
to two

lunch?

Whatever
45

as

ruling

reconvene

MR. BUNDERSON:

14

court's

additional

Let's

o'clock

13

view

to

that,

4

in

time

with

you

Whatever is a appropriate, Your
are

comfortable

with.

I can

do

minutes.

16

MR.

17

leaving,

18

like

19

through, I have no problem, but I have no problem in

20

talking a lunch.

it

OLIVER:
but
as

for

short

21

THE

COURT:

22

occasionally.

I guess
my

own

Molgard

if

I have

as p o s s i b l e .

If we

Well,

—

Mr.

my

support

Let's go to 1:30.

is
any

going
input,

could

staff

to

be

I'd

continue

likes

to

eat

We'll reconvene at

23 I 1:30
24
25 I

(Lunch recess.)
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affected Mr. Scott's right, or Mr. Scott's ability, to
have a fair and impartial trial, based upon the fact
that then the jury begins to look at me and discredit
my arguments and discredit my presentation of the
evidence, be it on cross-examination or direct, based
upon the fact that Mr. Bunderson has now attacked me
personally and emphasized two cases wherein I was
looking at something that I was either not going to
pursue or could not pursue.
THE COURT:

Counsel, as it relates to the two

arguments that you've raised on misconduct of the
prosecutor in this case, I'll rule that it is not
properly before the court by way of motion.
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

I understand.
I'll leave that open.

to rule on that.

I'm not going

I will rule that it is not properly

before the court now, so I won't accept your comments
as argument.

It should be submitted to the court in

proper form and allow Mr. Bunderson an opportunity to
respond.
Let's limit the argument here today, prior
to the sentencing^

to the motion to arrest the

judgment as set before the court by way of pleading.
Is there anything else that you have on that?
MR. OLIVER:

No, Your Honor.

I would just go on
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further and indicate, and this is not the thrust, but
indicate my contact with the juror, and I'll provide
the court with the juror's name if I didn't in the
motion.

As a matter of fact, I've never called a

juror in another case.

This is the first time I've

ever called a juror to find out what happened.

I was

really surprised when I spoke with this gentleman, and
I don't recall his name but I have it in the file.
just indicated that it was based on coincidences.
think that that's quite profound.

He
I

It's not -- I'm not

attacking that, I'm only indicating to the court that
that makes it an iffy situation.
But I would also indicate to the court
that thereafter, after the trial, I had a conversation
with two police officers who sat through the entire
trial, beginning to end, and they, prior to the jury
verdict, felt that Mr. Scott was innocent.

They were

quite emphatic on that.
I was thoroughly amazed at the jury
verdict and I don't believe that there was evidence
sufficient to show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that
Mr. Scott was involved in any criminal activity in
Brigham City.

Absolutely nothing was presented in

that context.

Being in Drewes Floral's office, if Mr.

Bunderson felt so inclined, perhaps a burglary charge
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1

might be appropriate, but certainly there's no nexus

2

to any theft and there was no evidence of any theft.

3

I don't see it, Your Honor.

4

THE COURT:

Mr. Bunderson.

5

MR. BUNDERSON:

I filed a response to this, Your

6

Honor.

I think the thrust of my response and the

7

thrust of my argument here today would be that the

8

defendant chose to try this to a jury.

9

like the result, obviously.

He doesn't

10

The court is not empowered

11

substitute your own judgment for that of the jury.

12

don't have a copy of the statute in front of me

13

dealing with arrested judgments, but I think it would

14

require something more than the court merely

15

disagreeing with the jury.

16

disagree with them, I don't know about that, but

17

nonetheless you wouldn't be in a possession to simply

18

substitute your judgment for their's, so long as ther

19

was any evidence upon which a reasonable jury could

20

find a conviction, and clearly there was.

21

ample evidence upon which a reasonable jury could bas

22

a conviction.

23

THE COURT:

24

MR. OLIVER:

25

to simply

I'm not saying you do

There was

Rebuttal argument.
Briefly.

ought to read the rule.

I

I think Mr. Bunderson

At any time prior to the
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1

imposition of sentence the court, upon its own

2

initiative --

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. OLIVER:

5

Tell me where the rule is.
Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of

Criminal Procedure.

6

THE COURT:

7

MR. OLIVER:

Very well.
"At any time prior to the imposition

8

of sentence the court, upon its own initiative, may,

9

or upon the motion of defendant, arrest judgment if

10

the facts proved or admitted do not constitute a

11

public offense; or if the defendant is mentally ill,"

12

and we're not alleging that," or there is other good

13

cause for the arrest of judgment.

14

"Upon arresting judgment the court may,

15

unless a judgment of acquittal of the offense charged

16

is entered or jeopardy has attached, order a

17

commitment until the defendant is charged anew or

18

retried, or may enter any other order as may be just

19

and proper under the circumstances."

20

an appropriate motion and the rules provide for the

21

court to supply its own judgment in place of the jury.

22

It's a very specific thing.

23

court's own motion or upon the defendant's motion.

24
25

This is exactly

It may be upon the

The situation is, Your Honor, as I've
indicated, and I'm not going to go through it again, I
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1

just wanted to address the rule.

2

do not constitute a public offense.

3

evidence of theft.

4

that something had happened.

5

know.

6

in any way, shape or form was connected with that.

7

The facts presented

There was no —

There was no
there was evidence

When and who we don't

There was absolutely no evidence that Mr. Scott

Even assuming the money found in Mr.

8

Reynolds' car was that of Drewes Floral, Mr. Reynolds

9

claimed ownership of it and the glove box was locked

10

and Mr. Scott had no access to it.

11

still intact.

12

there was no public offense committed and the evidence

13

didn't constitute a public offense.

14

The money was also

All of those factors indicate that

We would ask this court to arrest the

15

judgment and to indeed take appropriate action.

16

would ask for an acquittal, because I believe that's

17

what the evidence presented shows.

18

ask for a new trial.

19

that's the primary thrust of our motion.

20

THE COURT:

We

At minimum we'd

Would afek for an acquittal and

Thank you.

In ruling on your motion,

21

Rule 23 does set forth that the court, upon its own

22

motion or upon motion of the defendant, shall arrest

23

judgment if the facts proved or admitted do not

24

constitute a public offense.

25

I feel the standard is whether or not there was

In this particular case
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sufficient evidence that was submitted or introduced
that may lead the jury to determine that all of the
elements were proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Now,

if there wasn't sufficient evidence that was
submitted, then this court has to determine that and
then the court would arrest judgment.
In this particular case, the court finds
that there was evidence submitted to support each of
the elements.

I'm not saying whether that is beyond a

reasonable doubt or not.

That's up to the jury.

My

job in determining this is as to whether or not there
was evidence submitted which would support their
verdict.

I find that there was.

Therefore, your

motion to arrest judgment is denied, counsel.
MR. OLIVER:

May I just address that for one

brief second?
THE COURT:
MR. OLIVER:

For what purpose?
Well, because I don't believe the

rule anticipates -.THE COURT:

If you have anything you want to

place on the record for appeal you may do that, but
I'm not going to argue with you.
MR. OLIVER:
THE COURT:

I've made my ruling.

I wouldn't argue with the court.
Is th*re anything else that needs to

be placed on the record for appeal?
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